The efficiency of Public and Publicly-Subsidized High Schools in Spain. Evidence from PISA-2006.
Introduction
One of the defining characteristics of the Spanish compulsory educational system is its mixed or dual nature i.e. a predominant public network but a substantial private sector.
Within the latter, an important position is occupied by publicly-subsidized private schools (hereafter PSPS). PSPS, which account for 26% of secondary school enrolment in Spain, are owned and run privately, yet financed by local education authorities and the central government through a system of agreements regulated by the 1985 Right to Education Act (LODE, in its Spanish initials) 1 . The Spanish policy of financing certain private schools is aimed at allowing parents to choose freely between different schools and, indirectly, at stimulating inter-school competition to attract and retain students, which should generate improved school efficiency. The Spanish PSPS system is based on an administrative model which establishes the reciprocal rights and obligations of the owner of the private centre and the Education Authority, with regard to the financial conditions, duration, extension and termination of the agreement and other conditions for the provision of education 2 .
Formally, the Spanish PSPS system may be seen as a singular mechanism of public intervention in the education sector, combining the public funding and the private management of schools. These peculiar characteristics of PSPS invite an exploration of the efficiency of such schools compared to public schools (hereafter PS). The scarcity of research in Spain into the impact of these two alternative systems of free educational provision (public and publicly-subsidized) upon student performance justifies such a politically interesting analysis. Is the private management model of Spanish PSPS more efficient than the public management model of Spanish PS? Ultimately, this is the 1 Student distribution among different school types in Spain is as follows: PS 67%, PSPS 26% and private-independent schools 7%. 2 PSPS' obligations include the following: to provide free teaching at the agreed educational level, to request authorization for the charging of any fees for complementary activities, to maintain a specific pupil/teacher ratio and to apply the same admission criteria as PS. In exchange, the Administration undertakes to finance the activity of the school, through a system of economic modules per educational establishment, as established in the General State Budget. question the present study is intended to answer, employing the data provided by the third wave of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA-2006) , implemented by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) .
An initial examination of the average scores for PISA-2006 outcomes could lead to the conclusion that PSPS are more efficient than PS, since the crude (uncontrolled) results are higher in the former. It is true that the average score for science competencies for PSPS is 502.86 and 475.08 for PS (the average score for the whole population being 488.40), while the ANOVA test (5.89) indicates significant statistical differences between these two results. However, focusing on output variables would only be fair if school resources were identical (Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998) , and in fact PS and PSPS differ as much in the inputs they employ as in their outputs. The principal differences are concentrated in pupil characteristics (socio-economic status, parents' educational level and employment, and immigration status), as Table A1 in the Appendix shows. Since several studies have proven that these characteristics affect students' academic results (Sirin, 2005) , the challenge is to evaluate the performance of schools in a multi-dimensional setting.
In order to assess the impact of ownership upon school efficiency, we apply a nonparametric frontier analysis to the sample of Spanish PSPS and PS participating in PISA-2006 . The theoretical framework is provided by research dedicated to assessing the net differential quality of public and private schools. The seminal work by Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) is commonly considered as the origin of this literature. The empirical methodologies used in this paper are hierarchical linear modeling (hereafter HLM) and data envelopment analysis (hereafter DEA). As far as we are aware, no paper has employed the two methodologies jointly for the assessment of school efficiency.
Two aspects distinguish the present study from previous research. Firstly, special attention is paid to the empirical estimation of the underlying educational technology in the PISA-2006 data. The hierarchical structure of this dataset means that estimations must be performed via HLM. The conclusions extracted from these regressions allow us to select the variables for the subsequent DEA efficiency analysis in a robust empirical fashion. Secondly, our study decomposes the overall inefficiencies of each school into two components: managerial (resulting from its individual performance) and program (resulting from the structural differences between public and private management models). In order to perform this decomposition, we apply the approach of Silva Portela & Thanassoulis (2001) , itself based on Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1981) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature devoted to studying the relationship between school efficiency and public or private ownership. The estimation of the determinants of educational outcomes in PISA-2006 is performed in Section 3. The empirical assessment of the efficiency of Spanish PS and PSPS is presented in Section 4, and the final section offers a summary of the principal conclusions.
The efficiency of public and private schools: previous studies
It is a fairly widely-held belief in certain academic and social circles that private schools are more efficient than public ones, an evaluation based upon the economic reasoning which links efficiency to free market competition.
For advocates of private schools, the competition which these schools are subjected to (both from within their own system and from public schools), due to their need to attract students, forces them to be highly receptive to their customers' demands and stimulates both an efficient use of resources and an improvement in the quality of the education provided (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman & Friedman, 1981) . It has been stated that the survival and economic success of private schools is strongly dependent upon their satisfying user desires and expectations, forcing them to act efficiently and effectively: efficiently, since otherwise what they provide will be at a disadvantage to the competition, and effectively, since if they do not satisfy their customers' demands, students may leave in search of better service (Alchian, 1950) . In short, the threat of closure faced by private schools, if badly managed, leads invisibly to such schools acting optimally.
By contrast, public schools are seen as monopolies at a local level, with a captive audience guaranteed by the criterion of assigning school places on the basis of residential area (Peterson, 1990; Levin, 1976; Pincus, 1974; O'Donogue, 1971) . The opportunity for public school pupils to enroll elsewhere is therefore very limited, and would involve the "Tieboutian" method of "voting with your feet" (Tiebout, 1956) which, apart from being very costly in economic terms, is strongly influenced by circumstances other than strictly educational ones. Furthermore, the alternative of changing to a private school is also strongly conditioned by the price differential between public and private supply, and thus, as Chubb & Moe (1990) point out, this option will only be adopted in cases where the value of private schools, as perceived by families, is much higher than that of public schools. Nor must we forget that this possibility is, of course, limited to the minority of the population with the greatest financial resources. These considerations have led various authors to consider that, in contrast to private schools, the achievement of efficiency and a satisfactory response to consumer demands is of merely secondary importance in public schools.
However, a more detailed analysis of schools' day-to-day functioning calls the above reasoning into question, since the ability of users in the education sector to exercise an informed choice -a key element for guaranteeing the potential benefits from competition-is very limited, given the ambiguous nature of the concept of school quality.
In fact, after almost forty years of research into the subject, our knowledge of the factors which contribute to defining what is a "good school" remains very sketchy (see Hanushek, 2003 Hanushek, , 1997 Hanushek, and 1986 . Schools are to a large extent still "black boxes" for the academics who research them, and even more so for their users. This is due to the peculiarities of the education system's production process, which makes it difficult to clarify the responsibilities attributable to schools and the definition of a representative concept of school quality (see Mancebón & Bandrés, 1999) . Given this context, the best way to assess how well a school functions is by direct contact with it. However, "trying out the product" in the educational sphere involves major personal costs, given the problems of adaptation which changing schools usually involves. This is what Glennerster (1991) terms the "sunk costs" associated with school choice.
The immediate consequence of this situation may be that individuals who must choose between different schooling alternatives do so on the basis of highly visible variables such as the religious leanings of the school, its facilities, its extra-curricular activities, the type of students attending, proximity to the home and so on. All of these factors are of a non-academic nature, and their relationship to the quality of the actual education provided has not been clearly established. On occasions, families may possess information concerning schools' average academic results although, as Echols & Willms (1995) underline, these are inadequate indicators of quality unless accompanied by information on the academic and/or socio-economic background of pupils. Lee, Croninger & Smith (1996) discuss the problem of making decisions regarding education on the basis of virtually anecdotal or extremely superficial evidence of school quality, given that any other more thorough assessment would mean assuming significant information-related costs.
These limitations upon access to information regarding schools bring seriously into question the contention that competition has any effect upon the quality of schools, whether public or private, since users are unable to observe and measure such quality.
The theoretical argument of those who defend private education, in the terms described above, is therefore questionable.
Additionally, empirical research devoted to clarifying the relationship between school efficiency and public or private ownership is not conclusive. The origins of this literature are in Coleman et al. (1982) who, using cross-section achievement equations, concluded that private schools were more effective than public schools at educating students, even after controlling for differences in the personal and socio-economic background of students. Since then, a number of studies have attempted to contrast this result in a wide range of educational contexts, through the use of parametric and nonparametric techniques. Such literature has offered mixed conclusions: while a number of studies tend to confirm the results obtained by Coleman et al. (1982) (Opdenakker & Van Damme, 2006; Bettinger, 2005; Mizzala, Romaguera & Farren, 2002; Bedi & Garg, 2000; Stevans & Sessions, 2000; Neal, 1997; Jiménez, Lockheed & Paqueo, 1991; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hanushek, 1986) , in others the presumed superiority of private schools vanishes when the analysis includes a wide range of controls (Perelman & Santin, 2008; Mancebón & Muñiz, 2008; Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Abburrà, 2005; Fertig, 2003; Kirjavainen & Loikkanen, 1998; Goldhaber, 1996; Sander, 1996) or is reduced to specific measurements of the output analyzed (Greene & Kang, 2004) , or to specific groups of students defined by race, ethnic group, or academic or socioeconomic profile (Figlio & Stone, 1997) . In some cases, there exists a different effect for independent private schools and for PSPS (Dronkers & Robert, 2008; Corten & Dronkers, 2006) . Most such studies concern the American educational system and adopt a parametric approach. This explains why further research using different case studies and methodologies is needed, as Cherchye, De Witte, Ooghe & Nicaise (2010) point out. The present study may be seen as a new contribution to the puzzling debate on the relative efficiency of public and private schools, in the context of the Spanish educational system and using a non-parametric approach.
Estimation of the determinants of academic achievement in PISA-2006
This initial section is a first and necessary step for the correct selection of the input variables needed to feed the DEA analysis performed in the following section.
Subsection 3.1 presents the literature review of the determinants of academic
achievement. An econometric model is designed on the basis of this prior review, the results being presented in Subsection 3.3. Previously, Subsection 3.2 describes the data and methodology used in the analysis.
Determinants of educational outcomes: literature review
Our approach to the determinants of educational outcomes is structured by distinguishing between two levels, the first corresponding to student variables and the second to school variables. At the student level, we differentiate between three areas: firstly, personal variables; secondly, variables related to the socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the family; and thirdly, variables related to household resources and their use. At the school level, four different areas are established: firstly, general variables describing the school; secondly, variables describing the school's students (and therefore the peer-effects generated by the interaction between students); thirdly, variables related to the human and physical resources used by the school and, finally, a fourth group of variables describing certain educational processes the school undertakes. On the basis of this structure, the present subsection reviews the effect of these variables upon educational outcomes, taking into account recent theoretical developments and the empirical evidence available in the literature.
At the student level, gender stands among the most important personal variables. Girls' school performance is usually better than boys'; however, in the case of math and science competencies the opposite is true. In the three competencies measured in the PISA evaluation, for example, girls do better than boys only at reading, and lag behind in math and science (see OECD, 2006) .
Still at the student level, considerable empirical evidence has shown that household socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics are strong determinants of educational outcomes. The immigration status of the family has received special attention in recent years. Empirical evidence indicates that students born abroad tend to underperform (even after controlling for other significant variables), while there are no significant differences between national students and students born in the country to foreign parents (see Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Chiswick & Debburman, 2004; Kao & Tienda, 1995; Rong & Grant, 1992) . Schnepf (2008) , using TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA data for a set of eight OECD countries, shows that in general there is great heterogeneity within the group of immigrant students, the dispersion of their educational outcomes being higher than that of national students. Other socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics, such as parental educational level and socio-professional category, have also received much attention. Some of the most relevant studies exploring these effects are Dronkers (2008) , Marks (2005) , Gamoran (2001) and Rumberger & Larson (1998) .
The final set of variables at the student level concerns household resources and how students use them (see Calero & Escardíbul, 2007; Kang, 2007; Woessman, 2003) .
Research undertaken with PISA data has stressed the incidence on student outcome of the availability of books and the use of computers with educational objectives in the household. Specifically, the availability of books in the household is a very strong determinant of student performance, since it represents the family's cultural capital.
At the school level, general school characteristics are the first area of determinants we shall address. Here, one of the most relevant factors, from both a theoretical and empirical point of view, is ownership type i.e. private or public. Evidence in this area is far from conclusive, as Section 2 shows.
Several variables describing the characteristics of school students -or the classroom-are included in the second area of school level determinants. These characteristics influence, through peer effects, student performance. Authors such as Farley (2006), Willms (2006) and Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Mood, Weinfeld et al. (1966) have analyzed the incidence of the socio-cultural and socio-economic profiles of peers upon student performance. This kind of approach has also been used to analyze the peer effects generated by immigrant students. Calero & Escardíbul (2007) show, for example, how a high concentration of immigrant students is associated with negative effects on student performance. However, smaller concentrations of immigrant students do not generate any significant such effect.
Another area of determinants at school level is their physical and human resources. The detailed review offered by Hanushek (2003) makes clear that results in this area are far from conclusive. In the OECD (2007), where PISA data are used, most of the variables related to the availability and use of resources by the school are not statistically significant. Mancebón & Muñiz (2003) , after reviewing 42 studies published between 1980 and 2002, suggest that a plausible explanation for the lack of significance of school resources in the explanation of student performance lies in the fact that most of the studies reviewed concern developed countries, with relatively high (and similar) levels of school resources.
Schools' educational processes are included in the fourth and final area of determinants at the school level. As an example of these processes we will refer solely to the grouping of students by ability level. Kang (2007) and Hanushek, Kain, Markman & Rivkin (2003) describe how the negative effect of interaction with low-ability students is higher for this same group of low-ability students. Thus, processes of student grouping by ability level lead to negative effects on low-performing students. We could then expect the positive effect of grouping on high-performance students to be cancelled out by the negative effect on low-performance students, a situation which accounts for the results given by Gamoran (2004) , who finds that these practices seldom produce the positive results expected.
Data and methodology
The present study uses PISA-2006 microdata for Spain. Since 2000, the PISA program has examined every three years the academic achievement of 15-year-old students from different countries 3 in three competencies (reading, mathematics and science). PISA focused, in the year 2006, on the competency of science. PISA results are synthesized using a scale with an average score of 500 and a standard deviation of 100, for each of the three competencies. This scale is divided into six levels of proficiency, level 1 corresponding to low-scorers and level 6 to those students who show high-level thinking and reasoning skills.
PISA designs its sample using a two-stage method. In the first stage, a sample of schools is randomly selected from the entire list of centers providing schooling for 15year-olds. In the second stage, a random sample of 35 students is chosen from within each of the schools selected in the first stage. A school's probability of being selected by PISA is proportional to its size. Consequently, larger centers are more likely to be selected; nevertheless, students in larger schools have lower probabilities of being selected than students enrolled in smaller schools. Therefore, the probability of a school being chosen is equal to the result of multiplying the size of the center ( i N ) by the number of schools selected for the sample ( c n ) and dividing by the total number of 15-
year-old students (N).
(1) The principle of the independence of variables among the students of each center is not maintained, as a consequence of the above-mentioned two-stage sampling method employed. Students enrolled in the same school usually share socio-economic circumstances which make the average correlation among the variables of students within the center to be higher than that found among students from different schools (Hox, 1995) 5 .
HLM takes into account the nested structure of students in schools. HLM calculates a separate regression for each of the centers included in the sample (OECD, 2009a). Willms (2006) or Somers, McEwan & Willms (2004) are examples of the application of this methodology in the educational field.
The present paper structures data into two levels: students (level 1) and centers (level 2).
HLM allows the simultaneous analysis of the effects of variables of different levels and the influence of these variables on inequality within and between centers to be studied.
In other words, HLM permits the identification of the proportion of the total variance in scholastic achievement which can be attributed to the characteristics of schools and students.
Y is the expected science score of student "i" enrolled in school "j". kij X is a vector of "k" independent variables of the individual level and j Z is a vector of "l" variables of the school level. Equation 5 is obtained by substituting equations 3 and 4 (level 2) for the  in equation 2 (level 1). It is possible to distinguish in equation 5 a set of fixed effects 00 10 01
The dependent variable is the science score for students enrolled in PS and PSPS 6 . This score is calculated using plausible values (PV hereafter) for each student and a replication method which permits efficient estimations to be obtained (OECD, 2009b) .
PV are random values calculated from the distribution of the results. In PISA, students only answer part of the items constituting each test. PISA estimates each student's score for each item, using the distribution of probabilities of the different PV that the student has for the items. This procedure makes it possible to work with more than one estimation of student results.
Results
Table 2 presents the results corresponding to the multilevel regression: the first column lists the independent variables 7 introduced into the model, grouped into three blocks, individual, family or school. These variables have been included as a result of the theoretical approaches and empirical evidence described in Subsection 3.1. The second column presents the effects of these variables on PISA scores, following the same structure presented in Subsection 3.1 (two levels, divided into different areas). Table 3 provides information about the proportion of the variance explained, for each level, by the variables included in the complete model, in comparison to the null model. Nearly 85% of the variance in scores can be attributed to differences in student characteristics within schools. The results for the individual level variables are consistent with previous empirical evidence. The fact that students born earlier in the year continue to display a comparative advantage is also noteworthy. According to OECD (2006) data, women score lower than men in science. The strongest effects from among all the factors included in the model are linked to the grade repetition variables (REPMORE or REPONE). The negative signs of these effects suggest, on the one hand, that grade repetition policies are ineffective and, on the other, that it is difficult to determine whether repetition of an academic year directly causes low achievement or whether "repeaters" have certain characteristics in common -not included in the model-that make them low scorers.
TABLE 3 HERE
Household socio-economic and cultural characteristics proved to be very important to the explanation of student performance in science. Results associated with the immigrant origin of the family are noteworthy: students born in Spain to Spanish parents obtain better results in the science test than first-generation immigrant students, although score differences compared to second-generation immigrants are not significant. This could be interpreted as evidence of a process of assimilating and integrating immigrant families, and is reinforced by the fact that first-generation immigrant students who have not completed at least the entire compulsory secondary education level in Spain (ESO) score lower than first-generation immigrants who have been living in Spain for at least four years. Students whose parents are economically active and belong to qualified white-collar households achieve higher scores in PISA.
The results also show a positive and significant relationship between the years of schooling of mothers and the educational outcomes of their children.
Other results worthy of note are those related to the analysis of household educational resources and their use by students. Certain coefficients of the variables related to computer use show that correctly using educational resources (such as computers) has a stronger impact on students' educational outcomes than the simple fact of having educational resources available at home. Similarly, the number of books in the household would appear to be a suitable proxy for family cultural capital, and is strongly and positively correlated with PISA outcomes.
Ceteris paribus, students in PS obtain better results in the PISA science test than those enrolled in PSPS. This result must be emphasized, as previous studies of this subject in Spain, such as Mancebón & Muñiz (2008) and Calero & Escardíbul (2007) , found no significant differences in public and private school educational outcomes and, in the bivariate analysis, the former score lower than the latter.
According to the results, peer effects are the most important variables at the school level. The results in Table 2 also show that the negative impact upon students' educational outcomes of sharing their class with immigrant students is only significant when their proportion exceeds a certain threshold. The educational level of mothers has a positive effect not only upon their children but also upon their children's classmates.
Additionally, the proportion of girls at school is directly related to outcomes in PISA.
The only significant variables among the school resources factors included in our analysis were class size and the instructional computers/school size ratio. Large class size appears to have a negative effect on educational outcomes. The strong and negative sign linked to the ratio of computers variable remains unexplained and should be the subject of further research (a negative correlation between the ratio of computers and the reading results for Switzerland in PISA-2000 was also found by Meunier, 2008) .
The lack of significance of variables such as the student/teacher ratio or the existence of school counselors should help policymakers to measure the opportunity cost of common input-based policies.
Finally, no significant effects were found among the educational practices variables.
Different types of school autonomy were shown to be irrelevant. However, deeper insight into this factor would require more detailed data on different aspects of autonomy. Consequently, our results in this area should be treated with caution. When interpreting the ability grouping variables, it must be remembered that, although nonsignificant on average, ability grouping policies may have important effects on different types of students, as explained in Subsection 3.1. The three stages required by any productive efficiency analysis are now described in turn: the selection of inputs and outputs, the selection of the evaluation model and the discussion of the results.
Public and publicly-subsidized private high schools in

The selection of Spanish high school inputs and outputs for DEA analysis
The first stage in the performance of a productive efficiency analysis is the selection of the variables to proxy the results and inputs of evaluated decision-making units (DMUs) . In this regard, the data supplied by PISA-2006 are plentiful. As explained in Section 3, this international program supplies detailed information about student competence in different subjects (mathematics, reading and science), their socioeconomic and family background, and school inputs.
The prescriptions generally accepted in the DEA literature concerning variable selection establish that this must observe certain minimum requirements, as established by Bessent & Bessent (1980) : a conceptual basis for the relationship of inputs to outputs;
an empirically inferred relationship of measured inputs to outputs; increases in inputs must be associated with increases in outputs; and the measurements must not have zero elements.
In order to fulfill all these conditions, we base the selection of variables on the results obtained from empirical research into the determinants of educational outcomes in PISA-2006 (see Section 3). Specifically, we select the scores of 15-year-old students in science competencies as the output of Spanish PS and PSPS, and all the statistically significant variables described in the previous section as inputs (model 1) 8 . Table A3 in the Appendix summarizes the average and standard deviation for all these variables.
In summary, the efficiency of the Spanish PS and PSPS participating in PISA-2006 is estimated on the basis of 12 variables. One of these (PV) proxies output, two approximate the resources available to each school (IRATCO and CLSIZ) and the remaining nine proxy students' socio-economic and cultural background.
The selection of the DEA model
In addition to the choice of input variables, efficiency analysis requires deciding how to measure performance. In recent years, during which the assessment of the efficiency of different samples of educational institutions has seen notable growth, it has become clear that parametric techniques have major drawbacks as instruments for assessing the results of academic institutions. By contrast, non-parametric frontier methods, such as DEA, have shown themselves to be much more attractive in this context. The advantages claimed for this methodology in the assessment of school efficiency have been reinforced by its intensive use (Worthington, 2001) . The basic approach of DEA is to view schools as productive units which use multiple inputs (controllable and noncontrollable) and outputs. The method produces measurements of school efficiency by deriving a frontier production function (efficiency frontier) and measuring the distance of observations to this frontier. Observations on the frontier obtain an efficiency score of 1, while those under it obtain scores below 1, depending on their location.
This technique, based on mathematical programming, has evolved considerably since it first appeared in the seminal paper of Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978) . Specifically, multiple extensions of the initial model have attempted to adapt the mathematical formulation and the process of obtaining efficiency indices to the peculiarities of the particular sector analyzed, to the nature of the variables constituting the analysis, or to the aims of the research in question (see Cooper, Seiford & Zhu, 2004a and 2004b; Thanassoulis, 2001) .
From among the different proposals provided by the literature, the approach adopted by Silva Portela & Thanassoulis (2001) , based on Charnes et al. (1981) , is of particular interest for the task at hand. This approach decomposes the overall measurement of efficiency, computed using DEA, into managerial and program components. This approach is attractive, for it permits us to differentiate between inefficiencies attributable to the individual management of a decision-making unit (hereafter DMU) and those attributable to a unit's management program. This property interests us greatly, since we are attempting to compare the behavior of schools employing different management models. We shall explain this approach using Figure 1 . Finally, Z's program efficiency will be the residual part of the overall efficiency not attributable to individual management. Graphically, this is determined by the index Z'Z'''/ Z'Z'' (maximum output in the sector/output which Z would use, if its individual management were efficient). We can thus immediately confirm that:
Overall Efficiency = (Managerial Efficiency) x (Program Efficiency) The results in Table 4 indicate that the difference between overall efficiency in PS and PSPS is very slight and statistically non-significant. That is to say, once differences in student characteristics and school resources are taken into account, the advantages that PSPS display in crude educational results disappear. However, overall efficiency comprises the effects of both individual school performance and school management model, meaning that overall efficiency rates do not allow us to correctly interpret the crude results obtained in this paper without first decomposing managerial and program efficiency. For example, it may be the case that even though differences in overall efficiency between PS and PSPS were not detected, the formers' management model could negatively affect their result, and that the individual performance of each PS compensates for the disadvantage of adopting a much more bureaucratic management model compared to PSPS.
Results of the efficiency analysis
To resolve this question, we must consider the results provided in the second row in Table 4 i.e. the efficiency due to structural differences between management models (program efficiency). Although overall efficiency values do not display great divergence, the differences found in this case become statistically significant in favor of PS. Additionally, the percentage of schools which display maximum overall efficiency (values in brackets in Table 4 ) is considerably higher among PS than PSPS, leading us to conclude that best practices are implemented by a higher proportion of PS than PSPS.
In order to contrast the robustness of these results we perform a sensitivity analysis.
Such analyses are very important when using DEA, due to its non-parametric nature.
We propose three alternative specifications for the previously solved model 1. We remove the variable CLSIZE (model 2), then the variable IRATCO (model 3) and, finally, remove education resources, CLSIZE and IRATCO (model 4) . The effects of these variables upon educational outcomes are unclear, to judge by earlier literature (Hanushek, 2003) . Furthermore, we wish to analyze whether the differences found in program efficiencies between PS and PSPS are reduced when these resources are removed from DEA models. Table 5 displays the program efficiency scores for the four specifications described above. The results are robust in the four different models. Once differences in pupils background, school resources and individual management inefficiencies are removed, Spanish PS are more efficient than their PSPS counterparts.
Conclusions
The present paper performs a non-parametric efficiency analysis of Spanish PS and PSPS, using as reference the data supplied by PISA-2006 . For the analysis to be rigorous, a detailed study of the determinants of students' educational outcomes is made, employing HLM. Given the absence of any generalized empirical consensus regarding the variables stimulating students' academic success, we believe that any evaluation of school efficiency requires a thorough analysis of the empirical relationship between the variables selected as inputs and outputs.
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